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STATEMENT OF CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case presents the question of whether Idaho Code § 67 -5246( 4) requires an agency 
head to issue a final order on the merits in a contested administrative case within twenty-one days of 
receiving a petition for reconsideration. The district court held that the term "disposing of' as 
used in Idaho Code § 67-5246(4) does not mean that an agency head is required to decide the 
merits of a petition for reconsideration within twenty-one days and therefore dismissed A&B 
Irrigation District's ("A&B") petition for judicial review as not ripe for judicial review. A&B 
now appeals the district court's dismissal. Respondents Gary Spackman, the Interim Director of 
the Idaho Department of Water Resources ("Director"), and the Idaho Department of Water 
Resources (collectively referred to as "the Department") ask this Court to affirm the district 
court's dismissal of A&B's petition for judicial review. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND STATEMENT OF FACTS! 
On April 27, 2011, the Director issued his Final Order on Remand Regarding the A&B 
Irrigation District Delivery Call ("Final Order"). (R. Vol. I, pp. 3-24.) The 22-page Final 
Order addressed certain legal and factual issues surrounding A&B 's ongoing water delivery 
On May 11,2011, A&B filed a timely Petition for Reconsideration ("Petition") in the 
administrative proceeding, asking the Director to reconsider numerous findings and conclusions 
set forth in the Final Order. (Supp. R. Vol. I, pp. 4-17.) Specifically, A&B's detailed Petition 
1 Because the course of proceedings and the facts of this case are closely intertwined, 
these two sections are combined in this brief. 
2 Other issues related to A&B's water delivery call are currently pending before this 
Court in A&B Irr. Dist. v. IDWR, S.Ct. Doc. No. 38403-2011. 
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raised issues of fact and law, several of which were matters of first impression: A&B challenged 
the Director's analysis of presumptions afforded to decreed rights, questioned whether the 
Director's actions were within the scope of the district court remand, and disputed the Director's 
anal ysis of A&B' s water delivery system, his hydrogeological evaluation of A&B' s place of use, 
his evaluation of A&B' s enlargement acres, and his determinations related to A&B' s rates of 
di version. (Supp. R. Vol. I, pp. 2-12.) A&B also challenged the Director's application of the 
Conjunctive Management Rules, his response to A&B' s request to establish a reasonable 
pumping level in the A&B pumping area, and his factual characterizations of testimony. (Supp. 
R. Vol. I, pp. 12-13.) 
Idaho Code § 67-5246 of the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") governs the 
disposition of motions for reconsideration. Idaho Code § 67-5246 provides in pertinent part: 
(4) Unless otherwise provided by statute or rule, any party may file a motion for 
reconsideration of any final order issued by the agency head within fourteen (14) 
days of the service date of that order. The agency head shall issue a written order 
disposing of the petition. The petition is deemed denied if the agency head does 
not dispose of it within twenty-one (21) days after the filing of the petition. 
Idaho Code § 67-5246(4) (emphasis added). The Department's administrative rules of procedure 
include similar language. "The agency will dispose of the petition for reconsideration within 
twenty-one (21) days of its receipt, or the petition will be considered denied by operation of 
law." IDAPA 37.01.01.740.02(a). 
The Director reviewed A&B' s petition for reconsideration, stating in a letter to counsel 
for A&B that the Petition raised "numerous technical issues with the Final Order on Remand 
that deserved the Department's full attention and thorough analysis." (R. Vol. I, p. 145.) The 
Director further determined that "a detailed investigation of facts from the large and complex 
administrative record" was necessary to properly respond to the issues raised by A&B. Id. The 
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Director concluded that it would take more than twenty-one days for him to properly respond to 
the numerous issues raised in the petition. Id. Accordingly, on June 1,2011, within the twenty-
one day time period within which to respond, the Director entered an Order Granting Petition 
for Reconsideration to Allow Time for Further Review in the administrative proceeding, wherein 
he ordered that A&B's Petition be granted "for the sole purpose of allowing additional time for 
the Department to respond to the Petition." (R. Vol. I, pp. 137-138.) The order further provided 
that "an order responding to the merits of the Petition shall issue no later than June 9, 2011." (R. 
Vol. I, p. 138.) June 9,2011, was not a legal deadline, but a self-imposed deadline for 
expeditious resolution of the Petition.3 
The Director was not able to complete his review by the self-imposed June 9th deadline, 
so on June 9,2011, the Director entered an Amended Order Granting Petition for 
Reconsideration to Allow Time for Further Review extending the deadline to June 30, 2011. (R. 
Vol. I, p. 142.) 
On June 27, 2011, before the Director issued his amended order, A&B filed a Notice of 
Appeal and Petition for Judicial Review of Agency Action ("Petition for Judicial Review") in 
Minidoka County seeking judicial review of the Final Order. (R. Vol. I, pp. 26-30.) The case 
was reassigned to the presiding judge of the Snake River Basin Adjudication on June 27, 2011. 
(R. Vol. I, p. 1.) 
Three days later, on June 30,2011, the Director entered a 35-page Amended Final Order 
on Remand Regarding the A&B Irrigation District Delivery Call ("Amended Final Order") in 
3 The APA does not set a deadline for completing work on a Petition for Reconsideration. 
This is evidenced by contrasting Idaho Code § 67-5246 with Idaho Code § 61-626(2) (the Public 
Utilities Commission, upon granting a petition for reconsideration, must rehear the matter within 
thirteen weeks and must issue a decision within 28 days after the matter is finally submitted for 
reconsideration). 
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the administrative proceeding as well as a 17-page Order Regarding Petition for 
Reconsideration. (R. Vol. I, pp. 48-101.) In the Amended Final Order and the Order Regarding 
Petition for Reconsideration, the Director analyzed each of the issues raised by A&B's Petition. 
The Director agreed to a factual change in the order requested by A&B. (R. Vol. I, p. 64.) 
While the ultimate conclusion on other issues was not changed, the Director modified his 
analysis of some issues based upon A&B's Petition. (R. Vol. I, pp. 50-61, 63.) By its terms the 
Amended Final Order superseded the Final Order. (R. Vol. I. p. 67.) 
On July 7, 2011, the Department filed a Motion to Dismiss A&B' s Petition for Judicial 
Review. (R. Vol. I, pp. 40-42.) The Department asserted that the Final Order from which 
judicial review was taken by A&B was superseded by the Amended Final Order and therefore 
was not ripe for review. In support of its Motion to Dismiss, the Department filed the Affidavit of 
Chris M. Bromley. (R. Vol. I, pp. 44-102.) The Bromley affidavit consisted of two documents: a 
copy of the Director's June 30, 2011 Amended Final Order and a copy of the Director's June 30, 
2011 Order Regarding Petition for Reconsideration. 
On July 21,2011, A&B filed its Response to IDWR 's Motion to Dismiss ("Response") as 
well as a Motion to Strike. (R. Vol. I, pp. 107-121.) A&B's Response asserted that the Final 
Order is a final order from which judicial review may be sought, and that the Director lacked the 
authority to issue, among other things, the Amended Final Order. (R. Vol. I, p. 108.) A&B's 
Motion to Strike requested that the district court strike the Affidavit of Chris M. Bromley on the 
grounds that it is immaterial to this proceeding. (R. Vol. I, p. 119.) 
The Department filed its Response to A&B's Motion to Strike on July 26,2011, and its 
Reply in Support of its Motion to Dismiss on August 2,2011. (R. Vol. I, pp. 122-131.) With its 
Reply, the Department filed the Second Affidavit of Chris M. Bromley. (R. Vol. I, pp. 133-154.) 
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The district court heard oral argument on the Motion to Dismiss and the Motion to Strike 
on August 4,2011. (Tr. p. 1.) 
On August 11, 2011, the district court issued its order dismissing A&B' s appeal. (R. Vol. 
I, pp. 155-166.) While the district court concluded that the term "disposed of' as used in Idaho 
Code § 67-5246 is ambiguous, it nonetheless held that the term does not require an agency head 
to decide the merits and issue a final order in the matter within twenty-one days of receipt of a 
petition for reconsideration based upon the agency deference test announced by this Court in l.R. 
Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 120 Idaho 849, 820 P.2d 1206 (1991). (R. Vol. I, pp. 
171, 172, 174.) 
A&B did not file a notice of appeal but instead filed A &B Irrigation District's 
Unopposed Motion for I.R. CP. 54(b) Certificate of Final Judgment on August 26, 2011, seeking 
entry of a final judgment under LR.C.P. 54(b). On August 29, 2011, the district court issued an 
order granting A&B' s motion for an LR.C.P. 54(b) certificate of final judgment. Order Granting 
Motion for I.R.CP. 54(b) Certificate at 1.4 On the same day, the district court issued an 
amended order. (R. Vol. I, pp. 167-177.) The only change in the amended order was the 
addition of an LR.C.P. 54(b) certification. Order Granting Motion for I.R.CP. 54(b) Certificate 
at 3 ("The Amended Order on Motion to Dismiss will be identical to the Court's Order on 
Motion to Dismiss, save the insertion of a Rule 54(b) Certificate immediately following the 
Court's signature."). On September 15, 2011, A&B filed its Notice of Appeal. (R. Vol. I, pp. 
178-180.) 
4 Along with this brief, the Department is filing a Motion to Augment which seeks to 
augment the record with the district court's Order Granting Motion for I.R. CP. 54(b) 
Certificate. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A&B frames the first issue in this case as "whether the district court erred in concluding 
that IDWR did not have to dispose of A&B's petition for reconsideration within twenty-one (21) 
days .... " Opening Brief at 3 (emphasis added). This misstates the district court's holding. The 
district court held that the term "disposed of' was ambiguous and concluded that Idaho Code § 
67-5246 does not require an agency head to decide the merits and issue a final order in the matter 
within twenty-one days of receipt of a petition for reconsideration. (R. Vol. I, pp. 171, 172, 174; 
Opening Brief at 3.) Thus, contrary to A&B' s statement, the district court concluded that the 
Director did "dispose of' the petition for reconsideration as required by Idaho Code § 67-5246 
by granting the petition for reconsideration. Accordingly, the issues on appeal are more properly 
stated as follows: 
1. Whether the district court correctly held that Idaho Code § 67-5246 allows an 
agency head to "dispose of' a petition for reconsideration by issuing a written order granting the 
petition within twenty-one days of receipt of the petition and then subsequently issuing an order 
on reconsideration resolving the merits of the matter? 
2. Whether the district court correctly dismissed as premature A&B' s petition for 
judicial review of the Director's April 27, 2011 Final Order? 
3. Whether the district court reasonably exercised its discretion in denying A&B's 
motion to strike the Affidavit of Chris M. Bromley? 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Review of the District Court. "When reviewing a decision of the district court 
acting in its appellate capacity, the Supreme Court directly reviews the district court's decision." 
Laughy v. Idaho Dept. of Transp., 149 Idaho 867, 868, 243 P.3d 1055, 1056 (2010) (quoting 
Reisenauer v. State, 145 Idaho 948, 949, 188 P.3d 890, 891 (2008)). 
2. Statutory Interpretation. The interpretation of a statute is ordinarily a question of 
law over which this Court exercises free review. Idaho Power Co. v. Idaho Dept. of Water 
Resources, 151 Idaho 266, 272, 255 P.3d 1152, 1158 (2011). 
3. APA Standard of Review. Judicial review of a final decision by the Department 
is governed by the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act, title 67, chapter 52 of the Idaho Code. 
Idaho Code § 42-170 lA( 4). The agency's action may be set aside if the agency's findings, 
conclusions, or decisions (a) violate constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) exceed the 
agency's statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawful procedure; (d) are not supported by 
substantial evidence in the record; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
Idaho Code § 67-5279(3). In addition to proving one of the enumerated statutory grounds for 
overturning an agency action, the challenging party must also show prejudice to a substantial 
right. Idaho Code § 67-5279(4); Laughy, 149 Idaho at 868, 243 P.3d at 1056. 
4. Exercise of Discretion. The decision to grant or deny a motion to strike is 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Sprinkler Irr. Company v. John Deere Ins. 
Company, Inc., 139 Idaho 691, 696, 85 P.3d 667, 672 (2004). 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT IDAHO CODE § 67-5246 
ALLOWS AN AGENCY HEAD TO "DISPOSE OF" A PETITION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION BY ISSUING A WRITTEN ORDER GRANTING THE 
PETITION WITHIN TWENTY -ONE DAYS OF RECEIPT AND THEN ISSUING 
A SUBSEQUENT ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION RESOLVING THE 
MERITS OF THE MATTER. 
A. A&B's Petition For Judicial Review Was Properly Dismissed As Premature 
Because The Director Issued A "Written Order Disposing Of' A&B 's Petition 
For Reconsideration Within Twenty-One Days. 
The central focus of this case is the meaning of the term "disposing of' as used in section 
67-5246(4) of the APA. The district court found the term to be ambiguous and, through the 
application of the Simplot agency deference test, concluded that Idaho Code § 67-5246 does not 
require the Director to issue a final decision within twenty-one days of the filing of a petition for 
reconsideration. (R. Vol. I, pp. 171, 172, 174.) While the Department agrees with the district 
court's conclusion that Idaho Code § 67-5246(4) does not require the Director to issue a final 
decision within twenty-one days of the filing of a petition for reconsideration, the Department 
contends that the plain reading of the statute supports this holding, without need to apply the 
Simplot agency deference test. 
1. Under The Plain Language Of The APA, The Director Issued A "Written Order 
Disposing Of' A&B's Petition For Reconsideration When He Issued His June 1, 
2011 Order Granting Petition For Reconsideration. 
Idaho Code § 67-5246 governs final orders issued by administrative agencies under the 
AP A. Subsection (4) addresses petitions for reconsideration from final orders: 
(4) Unless otherwise provided by statute or rule, any party may file a motion for 
reconsideration of any final order issued by the agency head within fourteen (14) 
days of the service date of that order. The agency head shall issue a written order 
disposing of the petition. The petition is deemed denied if the agency head does 
not dispose of it within twenty-one (21) days after the filing of the petition. 
Idaho Code § 67-5246(4) (emphasis added). 
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When interpreting a statute, a court is guided by general principles of statutory 
construction and a common sense appraisal of what the legislature intended. State v. Paciorek, 
137 Idaho 629, 632,51 P.3d 443,446 (Ct. App. 2002). Statutory interpretation begins with the 
literal language of the statute. Idaho Power Co., 151 Idaho at 272,255 P.3d at 1158. If the 
statutory language is unambiguous, a court need not engage in statutory construction and should 
apply the statute's plain meaning. Id. 
The Director issued his Final Order on April 27, 2011. (R. Vol. I, pp. 3-24.) A&B filed 
its petition for reconsideration on May 11,2011. (Supp. R. Vol. I, pp. 4-17.) On June 1,2011, 
the twenty-first day after the filing of the petition, the Director issued a written order granting the 
petition. (R. Vol. I, pp. 137-138.) The order granting the petition expressly stated that the 
Director was granting the petition for reconsideration and that a later order on the merits would 
subsequently be issued by the Department. (R. Vol. I, p. 137.) 
Under a plain reading of Idaho Code § 67-5246(4), the Director's June 1,2011 order 
satisfies the criteria of this statute, as the Director issued "a written order disposing of' the 
petition for reconsideration. In general, the definition of terms within a statute or act control the 
meaning of the term. State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 478, 163 P.3d 1183, 1190 (2007). But 
in this case, the APA has not defined the term "disposing of." Where the legislature has not 
provided a definition in the statute, terms in the statute are given their common, everyday 
meanings. Id. The dictionary definition of the phrase "dispose of' is: 
1. To attend to; settle: disposed of the problem quickly. 
2. To transfer or part with, as by giving or selling. 
3. To get rid of; throw out. 
4. To kill or destroy: a despot who disposed of all his enemies, real or imagined. 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 4th Ed. (2000) (emphasis added). 
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In this case, the Director exercised his authority as provided for in the statute and issued a 
written order within the twenty-one day period granting the petition. Through his order, the 
Director "attended to" and "settled" the petition for reconsideration by granting the petition and 
agreeing to reconsider the issues of fact and law A&B requested he reconsider. The Director 
clearly signaled to A&B that the effectiveness of the first order was withdrawn by stating that a 
subsequent order would issue. 
A&B argues that the Department's interpretation is incorrect. A&B interprets the term 
"disposing of' narrowly as requiring the agency head to decide the merits of a petition for 
reconsideration and issue a final order in the case within twenty-one days of the filing of the 
petition for reconsideration. Opening Brief at 4-5. A&B argues that because the merits were not 
decided within twenty-one days, the Department's decision was final on June 2, 2011 by 
operation of law. Id. A&B's interpretation, however, cannot be reconciled with the language of 
the statute. The statute only requires the Director to issue a "written order disposing of' the 
petition within twenty-one days. The Director complied with the statute by issuing a written 
order granting reconsideration, which was the specific procedural relief that A&B requested. 
Idaho Code § 67 -5246(4) does not require the agency head issue a final decision on the merits, 
thus wrapping up the entire matter, within the twenty-one day time period as suggested by A&B. 
A&B attempts to read more into the statute than is actually there. 
The Department's plain reading is in accord with the leading commentary on Idaho's 
Administrative Procedure Act, The Idaho Administrative Procedure Act: A Primer for the 
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Practitioner, 30 Idaho L. Rev. 273 (1993), written by Michael S. Gilmore & Dale D. Goble.5 In 
their law review article, Gilmore and Goble specifically discussed Idaho Code § 67-5246 and the 
meaning ascribed to disposal of a petition for reconsideration. The authors state that an agency 
head is not required to make a final determination on the merits within twenty-one days: 
A petition for reconsideration that is not acted upon within twenty-one days is 
presumed denied. It is not necessary, however, that the officer decide the issues 
presented by the petition within twenty-one days; it is only necessary that the 
petition be accepted, which can be accomplished through notification of the 
parties that the officer will reconsider the order. 
Id. at 329 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). 
This definition is also consistent with the written explanatory comments that accompany 
the Idaho Attorney General's Model Rules of Administrative Procedure: 
In Rules 720, 730 and 740, the presiding officer has twenty-one days to act on a 
petition for reconsideration. But granting reconsideration is not the same as 
issuing the final decision following reconsideration. Reconsideration can be 
granted by issuing an order that says, "The petition for reconsideration is 
granted," then proceeding to schedule the further hearings, briefing, etc., on 
reconsideration. 
Idaho Administrative Procedure Act with Comments and Idaho Attorney General's Model Rules 
of Practice and Procedure, Written Comments to Rules 710 through 789 (1993) (R. Vol. I, pp. 
164-165). 
5 Professor Dale Goble of the University of Idaho College of Law and Deputy Attorney 
General Michael Gilmore are recognized authorities on the APA. They were both intimately 
involved in the substantial overhaul of the APA that took place in 1993. Professor Goble was the 
primary drafter of the APA and was the one that provided explanatory comments explaining how 
the APA would function. Larry Echohawk, Introduction to Administrative Procedure Act Issue, 
30 Idaho L. Rev. 261 (1993). Mr. Gilmore participated in the drafting of the APA and also 
drafted the model rules of practice for the Idaho Attorney General's office. Id. 
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The principles behind this interpretation are clear. Administrative agencies should be 
provided the opportunity correct alleged errors in its orders. As articulated by Gilmore and 
Goble: 
An important principle of administrative law is that the agency should be given 
the first opportunity to correct its possible errors. The APA's provisions for 
contested cases incorporate this principle by explicitly authorizing petitions for 
reconsideration. Regardless of the kind of order, the presiding officer has 
authority to entertain petitions for reconsideration of the order if the petition is 
filed within fourteen days of the issuance of the order. While the filing of a 
petition for reconsideration is not a prerequisite to administrative or judicial 
review of the order, the officer who issued the order will have greater familiarity 
with the factual and legal issues than will other potential decisionmakers. It is 
therefore far more efficient for all parties to have that officer reconsider the order, 
particularly when minor or technical problems arise. 
30 Idaho L. Rev. at 328-29. 
A&B's interpretation would frustrate the purpose for encouraging an agency to 
reconsider its decision. Having time to properly evaluate and address issues raised by a party in 
a petition for reconsideration is important. As recognized by the district court, petitions for 
reconsideration vary widely in their content, form, and substance. (R. Vol. 1, p. 172.) Some 
petitions for reconsideration are easily addressed, while others, like the broad reaching petition in 
this case, are not. Id. Of course, this cannot be known until the petition for reconsideration is 
filed and reviewed by the agency. In the case of a complex petition for reconsideration, A&B's 
short twenty-one day "one size fits all" approach would prevent an agency, for lack of time, from 
requesting additional hearings, briefing, oral argument, or taking the necessary amount of time to 
properly respond. 30 Idaho L. Rev. at 329. A&B's interpretation would foster litigation and 
interfere with judicial economy as agencies would not have time to correct errors in complex 
proceeding. 
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The fact that Idaho Code § 67-5246(4) uses the term "written order disposing of' in its 
construction and did not say that the Director must issue a final decision on the merits within the 
twenty-one day period is important. Contrast Idaho Code § 67-5246(4) with Idaho Code § 61-
626(2) (the Public Utilities Commission, upon granting a petition for reconsideration, must 
rehear the matter within thirteen weeks and must issue a decision within 28 days after the matter 
is finally submitted for reconsideration). The phrase "written order disposing of' provides 
agencies with the necessary flexibility to properly analyze and respond to the myriad petitions 
for reconsideration they face. 
The practical effect of this is evident in this case. Here, A&B' s Petition "raised 
numerous technical issues with the Final Order on Remand that deserved the Department's full 
attention and thorough analysis. This required a detailed investigation of facts from the large and 
complex administrative record." (R. Vol. I, p. 145.) The result was a thorough evaluation of the 
"errors" alleged by A&B in its petition for reconsideration and resulted in the Director adding 
significant additional analysis into his June 30, 2011 Amended Final Order, evidenced by the 
fact that the new analysis added 13 pages to the Amended Final Order, bringing it to a total 
length of 35 pages. (R. Vol. I, pp. 48-10 1.) This considered evaluation of the original order was 
the appropriate response to A&B' s petition. 
A&B's interpretation would have forced the Director to issue a partially considered 
decision. Instead of allowing the Director to address the alleged errors in the first instance, 
A&B 's approach would lead to a potential remand to do exact! y what the Director did in this 
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proceeding - issued a thoroughly considered opinion. A&B's interpretation only serves to limit 
informed decision making and foster additionallitigation.6 
A&B attempts to create ambiguity where none exists in the statute based upon by 
citation to cases where the phrase "dispose of' or some variation of the phrase appears. An 
examination of the cited cases, however, shows that they are not interpreting the term in the 
context of the APA and that they are therefore distinguishable. For example, Evans State Bank 
v. Skeen, 30 Idaho 703, 167 P. 1165 (1917) examined the statutory definition of the term "final 
judgment" not the term "dispose of' in an entirely different statutory setting. Skeen appealed a 
district court order appointing a receiver of mortgaged personal property, an order overruling a 
motion to vacate the receivership, and an order directing the sale of the property. Evans State 
Bank moved to dismiss on the grounds that the orders were not final judgments. The Court 
explained that the right to appeal was statutory and reviewed the statutory definition, concluding 
that "[a]n examination of [the applicable statute] discloses that no appeal has been provided for 
from an order appointing a receiver" or the other orders. Evans State Bank, 30 Idaho at 705, 167 
P. at 1166. While the Court did use the term "disposes of' and discussed a final determination 
by the district court, the Court did not define the words. The reference to a final determination of 
litigation had more to do with the fact that the Court was evaluating final orders. The question 
presented in Evan State Bank was which district court orders were appealable pursuant to statute. 
6 A&B's argument that the district court's interpretation would cause petitions for 
reconsideration to "all but cease to exist" does not hold up. Opening Brief at 11. If a party is 
aware of an error in an agency's decision, the party should want to resolve it on reconsideration 
before the agency because if the matter is appealed to district court and the district court agrees 
that an error did occur, the matter would likely be remanded back to the agency to correct. A 
petition for reconsideration encourages judicial economy by allowing the agency the opportunity 
to correct the alleged error in the first instance, thereby saving the time it takes to appeal to 
district court. 
-14-
Applying Evans State Bank in this case is an attempt to create a definition using a different 
factual scenario that did not scrutinize or analyze the term, much less scrutinize or analyze the 
term in the context of the APA. Put simply, the question presented in this case is not the 
question answered in Evans State Bank or the other cases cited by A&B. 
2. The District Court's Interpretation Does Not Render The Twenty-One Day Time 
Period Irrelevant or Prevent Timely Judicial Review. 
A&B argues that the failure to adopt its interpretation would render the twenty-one day 
period in Idaho Code § 67-5246(4) irrelevant because the other interpretations "clearly do[] not 
follow the statue's mandate requiring the agency to finally act within 21 days." Opening Brief at 
10. This argument is circular and assumes as a given the very question at issue. 
A&B also argues that if its interpretation is not adopted, that an "agency could prevent 
timely judicial review for an indefinite period of time." Id. By suggesting that an agency will 
prevent timely judicial review, A&B is asking this Court to assume that an agency will not act 
within a reasonable time frame. As is evidenced by the actions of the Department in this case, it 
is not reasonable to assume that an agency will not act in a timely manner.7 Moreover, Idaho 
Code § 67-5201 (3 )(b) defines agency action to include "the failure to issue a rule or order," so 
that a party who believes that an agency has failed to timely act upon a granted petition for 
reconsideration may petition for judicial review from the agency action of failure to issue an 
order. As Gilmore and Goble explained: 
Perhaps the most common situation in which finality issues arise is when an 
agency refuses or fails to act. When an agency is sued on the grounds that a 
statute requires it to do something, the most common response is that it has not as 
7 The Director's response time in this case was reasonable. The Director issued his 
Amended Final Order only 29 days after granting the petition for reconsideration. This 
timeframe is reasonable given the number and complexity of the issues raised by A&B in its 
petition and the Director's detailed response in his Amended Final Order. 
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yet completed consideration of the matter and that there is, therefore, no final 
agency action to review. The obvious dilemma is that inaction at some point 
effectively becomes a decision to deny. If there is to be meaningful judicial 
review of agency decisions, finality defenses must be set aside at some point. The 
APA recognizes this problem by specifically defining "agency action" to include 
"the failure to issue a rule or order ... or failure to perform, any duty placed on the 
agency by law." 
30 Idaho L. Rev. at 349 (footnotes omitted). 
Alternatively, as this Court recently pointed out in Idaho Power Co. v. Idaho Dept. of 
Water Resources, if an agency unreasonably delays performance of its duties, the complaining 
party has remedy under Idaho Code § 7-302 and can seek a writ of mandamus to compel action 
by the agency. Idaho Power Co., 151 Idaho at 273,255 P.3d at 1163. 
3. The District Court's Interpretation Does Not Result In Uncertainty In When An 
Order On Reconsideration Is Subject To Judicial Review Or When An Order On 
Reconsideration Becomes Effective. 
A&B suggests that the district court's interpretation results in uncertainty in when an 
order is subject to judicial review and when it becomes effective. Opening Brief at 10. This is 
not true. A careful reading of the AP A shows that there is a well defined process for determining 
when an order is subject to judicial review and becomes effective. 
Assume, as in this case, an agency head issues a final order and then a petition for 
reconsideration is filed. If the agency disposes of the petition by granting the petition within 
twenty-one days and the agency subsequently issues an amended final order, the amended final 
order is considered an order on reconsideration. See Erickson v. Idaho Bd. of Registration of 
Professional Engineers and Professional Land Surveyors, 146 Idaho 852, 855-856, 203 P.3d 
1251, 1254-1255 (2009) (a final order denying a petition for reconsideration is an order on 
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reconsideration). 8 Once an order on reconsideration is issued, it is subject to judicial review 
under Idaho Code § 67-5273(2). Erickson, 146 Idaho at 854, 203 P.3d at 1253 ("[Idaho Code § 
67 -5273(2)] requires that if reconsideration of the final order is sought, the petition for judicial 
review must be filed within twenty-eight days after the decision on reconsideration."; City of 
Eagle v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 150 Idaho 449, 452, 247 P.3d 1037, 1040 (2011). This 
is because Idaho Code § 67-5273(2) requires that if reconsideration of the original final order is 
sought, the petition for judicial review must be filed within twenty-eight days after "the decision 
thereon." Idaho Code § 67-5273(2). It is significant that Idaho Code § 67-5273(2) does not say 
that a petition for judicial review must be filed within twenty- eight days of the petition being 
"disposed of' but uses the different standard of "decision thereon." Evans v. Teton County, 139 
Idaho 71, 78, 73 P.3d 84, 91 (2003) (statutes should be construed so that effect is given to their 
provisions). The fact Idaho Code §§ 67-5246(4) and 67-5273(2) use different language supports 
the district court's interpretation that the Department can dispose of a petition for reconsideration 
by granting the petition and then issue a later decision on the merits. Because the Director's 
Amended Final Order was clearly "the decision thereon," A&B' s argument that the district 
court's interpretation would result in confusion about when to file a petition for judicial review is 
not convincing. 
A&B also argues that the district court's interpretation of subsection (4) of Idaho Code § 
67-5246 cannot be reconciled with subsection (5) and would result in confusion about the 
8 While the administrative agency in Erickson issued an order denying a petition for 
reconsideration and, in this case, the Director granted the petition for reconsideration and 
subsequently issued his amended final order, it does not change the analysis here. The amended 
final order was still a decision on reconsideration and subject to judicial review under 67-5273(2) 
under the Court's reasoning in Erickson. 
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effecti ve date of an order on reconsideration.9 Opening Brief at 9. Contrary to A&B' s 
argument, there is no conflict between subsections (4) and (5) under the district court's 
interpretation, and there is no confusion about the effective date of an order on reconsideration. 
Idaho Code § 67-5246(5) addresses the effective date of a final order. This subsection 
provides, in relevant part, that "[u]nless a different date is stated in a final order, the order is 
effective fourteen (14) days after its service date if a party has not filed a petition for 
reconsideration." 
In this case, the Director issued his Amended Final Order on June 30, 2011. As 
discussed above, the Amended Final Order is an order on reconsideration and a petition for 
judicial review must be filed within twenty-eight days of its service. Erickson, 146 Idaho at 854, 
203 P.3d at 1253. The APA does not provide for a petition for reconsideration of an order on 
reconsideration, instead making it subject to a petition for judicial review within twenty-eight 
days of its service. [d. Because there can be no petition for reconsideration filed against an 
order on reconsideration, an order on reconsideration is effective fourteen days after its service. 
Idaho Code § 67-5246(5). A careful analysis of Idaho Code §§ 67-5246 and 67-5273 shows that 
there is an orderly and defined path for when an order on reconsideration becomes effective and 
is subject to a petition for judicial review. In this case, the Director's Amended Final Order 
became effective fourteen days after its service. 
9 Effectiveness and appealability (i.e. being subject to judicial review) are distinct 
concepts. 
-18-
4. The District Court's Interpretation Is Consistent With The Department's Rules Of 
Procedure. 
A&B argues that the district court's interpretation is inconsistent with the Department's 
rules of procedures. Opening Brief at 3. This is not correct. 
The Department's rules of procedure for contested cases are found at IDAPA 37.01.01. et 
seq. IDAPA 37.01.01.740 outlines the information that must accompany a final order issued by 
the Department and sets forth the Department's understanding of the time frame for a party to 
appeal a final order of the Department. This rule provides that an appeal must be filed within 
twenty-eight days: 
(a) of the service date of this final order, (b) of an order denying petition for 
reconsideration, or (c) [of] [sic] the failure within twenty-one (21) days to grant or 
deny a petition for reconsideration, whichever is later. 
IDAPA 37.01.01.740.02.d. This language confirms the Department's interpretation of how the 
petition for reconsideration process and the judicial review process works and is consistent with 
the Department's interpretation of Idaho Code § 67-5246. If a final order is issued, there are 
three different deadlines to file an appeal. Under subsection (a) of IDAPA 37.01.01.740.02.d., 
an appeal is due within 28 days of the service date of the final order if no petition for 
reconsideration is filed. Under subsection (b), an appeal is due twenty-eight days after an order 
denying petition for reconsideration. Under subsection (c), an appeal is due within twenty-eight 
days of the failure of the Department to "grant or deny" a petition for reconsideration with 
twenty-one days of service of the petition. 
It is this last subsection (c) that is significant. The rule does not use the term "disposed 
of' but focuses on the "failure" to "grant or deny" the petition for reconsideration. It recognizes 
that if the Department grants a petition for reconsideration, it is not ripe for judicial review 
because an appeal is due only if the Department fails to "grant or deny" the petition. This 
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evidences that the district court's and the Department's interpretation is consistent with the 
Department's own rules and also evidences that this has been the Department's longtime 
interpretation of subsection (4).1 0 
A&B's argument rests on the premise that an agency head can only revise an order 
within twenty-one days once a petition for reconsideration is filed. A&B's argument leads to the 
illogical conclusion that the agency's hands are tied and cannot ask for additional briefing on an 
issue, schedule more hearings, or ask for oral argument. An interpretation of a statute must be in 
accord with common sense and reason. Smith v. Smith, 131 Idaho 800, 802,964 P.2d 667, 669 
(1998); State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc., 130 Idaho 727,735,947 P.2d 400, 407 
(1997). The district court's conclusion is the correct one: "A&B's interpretation is unreasonable 
and would lead to absurd results .... " (R. Vol. I, p. 172.) And while the district court ultimately 
reached this conclusion only after finding the statutory term ambiguous, this Court should affirm 
the district court's dismissal on the ground that the Director acted consistent with the plain 
language of the statute. 
B. The District Court Correctly Held That The Department's Interpretation Of Idaho 
Code § 67-5246 Is Entitled To Deference Under the Simp lot Agency Deference 
Test. 
While the Department contends that the plain language of the APA supports the district 
court's decision, if this Court finds the phrase "disposing of' to be ambiguous, this Court should 
affirm the district court's decision under the Simplot deference test. 
The district court found that the term "disposed of' is not defined under IDAPA and "that 
reasonable minds might differ as to its interpretation, making it subject to conflicting 
10 This language appeared in the original rules as drafted in 1993. In 2000, the rule was 
given a new subheading, but the text of the rule itself did not change. Idaho Administrative 
Bulletin, October 6, 1999, pp. 553-34. 
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interpretation." (R. Vol. I, p. 171.) Once the district court found that the term was ambiguous, 
the district court then evaluated the Department's definition under the deference test announced 
by this Court in l.R. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 120 Idaho 849, 820 P.2d 1206 
(1991). The four-prong deference test of Simplot is as follows: 
(1) the court must determine whether the agency has been entrusted with the 
responsibility to administer the statute at issue, (2) the agency's statutory 
construction must be reasonable, (3) the court must determine that the statutory 
language at issue does not treat the precise issue, and (4) a court must ask whether 
any of the rationales underlying the rule of deference are present. 
Pearl v. Board of Professional Discipline of Idaho State Bd. of Medicine, 137 Idaho 107, 
113,44 P.3d 1162, 1168 (2002) (citing l.R. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 120 
Idaho 849, 820 P.2d 1206 (1991 )). If this test is met, the court will give "considerable 
weight" to the agency's interpretation. Id. As shown below, the four prongs of the 
Simplot test are present in this case. 
1. The Department Is Entrusted With Interpreting The AP A. 
The first prong of the Simp lot test is met in this case as the Department "has been 
entrusted with the responsibility to administer the statute at issue." Simplot at 849, 862, 820 P.2d 
at 1219. In this case, the Idaho Legislature has statutorily declared that the Director must comply 
with and shall conduct all administrative proceedings in accordance with the APA. Idaho Code § 
42-1701A. As the district court correctly found, with the statutory proclamation ofIdaho Code § 
42-1701A, "the Department is entrusted to administer Idaho Code § 67-5246 with respect to 
petitions for reconsideration filed in the administrative actions before it." (R. Vol. I, p. 172.) As 
further evidence of the Director's responsibility to administer the statute, the Director has been 
given authority to and has in fact promulgated rules related to administrative proceedings. Idaho 
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Code § 42-1701A(1); IDAPA 37.01.01 et seq. These rules set forth the rules of procedure that 
govern contested case proceeding before the Department. IDAPA 37.01.01.001.02. 
Citing the Idaho Supreme Court case Westway Construction, Inc. v. Idaho Department of 
Transportation, 139 Idaho 107, 116,73 P.3d, 721, 730 (2003), A&B suggests that because other 
agencies are also charged with authority to administer the APA, the Department's interpretation 
is not entitled to deference. Opening Brief at 16. Westway is distinguishable, however, as the 
Idaho Legislature has expressly directed the Department to apply and interpret the APA and to 
promulgate its own rules for that purpose. Idaho Code § 42-1701A; see Stafford v. Idaho Dept. 
of Health & Welfare, 145 Idaho 530, 538, 181 P.3d 456,464 (2008) (appropriate authority found 
where an agency has been empowered to carry out actions consistent with statute and to 
promulgate its own rules for that purpose). Furthermore, it is significant that the Department's 
interpretation is consistent with the explanation by the recognized authorities on the AP A, 
Gilmore and Goble, in their frequently cited and often relied-upon law review article that serves 
as a reference for interpreting the AP A. ll Likewise, the Department's interpretation is consistent 
with the comments for the Attorney General's model rules. Because both of these authorities are 
undoubtedly relied upon by other agencies and the Attorney General's office, which provides 
II The following is a list of some of the cases and secondary authorities that have cited to 
Gilmore and Goble's law review article The Idaho Administrative Procedure Act: A Primer for 
the Practitioner: Laughy v. Idaho Dept. ofTransp., 149 Idaho 867, 871, 243 P.3d 1055, 1059 
(2010); Westway Const., Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dept., 139 Idaho 107, 114, 73 P.3d 721, 728 
(2003); Petersen v. Franklin County, 130 Idaho 176, 182,938 P.2d 1214, 1220 (1997); Northern 
Frontiers, Inc. v. State ex. reI. Cade, 129 Idaho 437, 440, 926 P.2d 213,216 (Idaho Ct. App. 
1996); Idaho Op. Atty. Gen. No. 01-3 (2001); Land Use And The Lost Promise Of Cooper: What 
Happened To The "Judicial" In Quasi-Judicial Proceedings?, 44 Idaho L. Rev. 735, 768 (2008); 
Determining The Appropriate Level Of Judicial Deference To Public School Board 
Determinations Of Cause In Wrongful Termination Cases, 38 Idaho L. Rev. 781, 813 (2002); 
State Administrative Agency Action Under The Revised Idaho Administrative Procedure Act: A 
Question Of Judicial Deference, 32 Idaho L. Rev. 139, 153 (1995). 
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legal representation for state agencies, there is little concern for conflicting interpretations by 
other agencies as suggested by A&B in its brief. Opening Brief at 16. 
2. The Department's Interpretation Of Idaho Code § 67-5246 Is Reasonable. 
The second prong of the Simplot test is also met as the district court correctly found that 
the Department's interpretation is reasonable. (R. Vol. I, p. 172.) In this prong, a court can 
evaluate reasonableness by examining the policy reasons supporting the interpretation. See 
Canty v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 138 Idaho 178, 183,59 P.3d 983,988 (2002) (the agency 
interpretation is consistent with policy of construing tax credits in favor of the state and guards 
against a double taxation). The district court found strong policy considerations supporting the 
Department's interpretation. The district court acknowledged that the substance and content of 
petitions for reconsideration can vary significantly. Some are simple and some are complex. 
The district court, with its extensive experience gained from its handling of the water delivery 
cases, recognized that the issues presented in water delivery call cases are complex and that most 
petitions for reconsideration in a delivery call case would also be complex in nature. (R. Vol. I, 
p. 172.) 
Likewise, this Court is familiar with the complex nature of water administration cases. 
American Falls Reservoir Dist. No.2 v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 143 Idaho 862,154 
P.3d 433 (2007); Clear Spring Foods, Inc. v. Spackman, 150 Idaho 790, 252 P.3d 71 (2011); 
A&B Irr. Dist. v. IDWR, S.Ct. Doc. No. 38403-2011 (A&B's delivery call); A&B Irr. Dist. v. 
IDWR, S.Ct. Doc. No. 38191-2010 (Surface Water Coalition delivery call). Issues involving 
legal question of first impression, complex questions of ground water modeling, presumptions 
and burdens associated with evidence, conjunctive management rules, complex geological 
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connectivity issues over vast swaths of the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer, are just a subset of the 
issues that have been presented in these water call delivery cases. 
In this specific case, A&B' s petition for reconsideration challenged the Director's 
analysis of presumptions afforded to decreed rights, whether the Director's actions were within 
the scope of the district court remand, the Director's analysis of A&B' s water delivery system, 
the Director's hydrogeological evaluation of A&B place of use, the Director's evaluation of 
A&B's enlargement acres, and the Director's determinations related to A&B's rates of diversion. 
(Supp. R. Vol. I, pp. 4-17.) A&B also challenged the application of the Conjunctive 
Management Rules, the Director's response to A&B' s request to establish a reasonable pumping 
level in the A&B pumping area, and the Director's factual characterizations of testimony. Id. 
The Director determined that some of the points raised by A&B were worthy of additional 
consideration and response, so he undertook "a detailed investigation of facts from the large and 
complex administrative record." (R. Vol. I, p. 145.) The result was the Director's Amended 
Final Order issued on June 30, 2011. 
A&B 's narrow interpretation of Idaho Code § 67-5246 requires a final decision on the 
merits within twenty-one days of the filing of the petition for reconsideration. As the district 
court correctly found, this is unreasonable for such complex cases and would lead to absurd 
results. (R. Vol. I, p. 172.) The district court correctly concluded that Idaho Code § 67-5246 
does not prohibit an agency head from issuing a written order granting the petition for 
reconsideration and then taking additional steps to ultimately issue a revised final order past the 
twenty-one day time period. Id. at 174. As the district court stated: 
[I]f there is a scheduling conflict wherein the agency head cannot, for whatever 
reason, have briefing, oral argument, and a written opinion completed within the 
21 day period, the agency head would simply be forced to issue a written opinion 
addressing the merits without the benefit of briefing and/or oral argument. 
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Id. at 172.12 Or, in another situation that the district court did not discuss, the agency head would 
be required to deny a petition without examining its merits because of the inability to 
intelligently address the merits. 
An important principle of administrative law is that the agency should be given the first 
opportunity to correct its possible errors. 30 Idaho L. Rev. at 328. The district court found the 
Department's interpretation to be consistent with this policy as it "allows the agency the time to 
take the steps necessary to adequately consider and respond to a complex motion for 
reconsideration .... " (R. Vol. I, p. 172.) Because the Department's interpretation is reasonable 
and is supported by sound policy, the second prong of the Simplot test is met here. 
3. The District Court Found That The Term "Disposed Of' Is Ambiguous. 
The district court found the term "disposed of' is undefined, and subject to conflicting 
interpretations, and therefore the term is ambiguous. Thus, the third prong of the Simplot test is 
satisfied. 
4. The Rationales For Deference To The Department's Interpretation Are Present. 
The forth prong requires a court look for the rationales underlying deference. The 
rationales to be considered include: 
(1) the rationale requiring that a practical interpretation of the statute exists, (2) 
the rationale requiring the presumption of legislative acquiescence, (3) the 
rationale requiring agency expertise, (4) the rationale of repose, and (5) the 
rationale requiring contemporaneous agency interpretation. 
Canty v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 138 Idaho 178, 184,59 P.3d 983,989 (2002). 
12 A&B complains that the Department did not take any of these steps. Opening Brief at 
17, n.13. While IDWR did not set a briefing schedule or take these other steps, the court was 
rightfully highlighting the steps that might be required by an agency head to properly address a 
petition for reconsideration. Adopting A&B' s interpretation would bar administrative agencies 
from ever taking such actions, a result that concerned the district court. 
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The first rationale underlying deference is that the agency interpretation is "practical." 
The district court found that: 
as a practical matter the Department's interpretation makes sense in that it is not 
always possible or practical for an agency head to have to rule on the merits of a 
petition for reconsideration with [sic] 21 days of filing, especially where the 
agency head desires further briefing to be submitted and oral argument on the 
issues raised. The alternative result would undermine any meaningful opportunity 
to have the agency head consider the merits of a petition for reconsideration. 
(R. Vol. I, pp. 172-173.) 
The second rationale examines legislative acquiescence. This Court has found that "[b]y 
not altering the statutory text the legislature is presumed to have sanctioned the agency 
interpretation." Canty, at 184, 59 P.3d 989 (citations omitted). In this case, the legislature has 
acquiesced in the Department's interpretation of subsection (4) of Idaho Code § 67-5246. In 
2010, this section was amended. However, the legislature did not amend or change the phrase 
"disposing of." The legislature has also acquiesced in the interpretation though the adoption of 
the Department's rules of procedure. As described above, IDAPA 37.01.01.740 mirrors the 
Department's interpretation of Idaho Code § 67-5246. This rule was promulgated under the 
APA's rulemaking processes and was submitted for review by the Idaho Legislature and became 
effective after conclusion of the regular session. Idaho Code § 67-5224(5)(a), Idaho 
Administrative Bulletin, October 6,1999, pp. 553-34. 
The third rationale looks to agency expertise. The district court found that this rationale 
was also met, as the Department has "expertise in the field of water law and delivery calls, which 
is the subject matter of the Petition for Reconsideration in this case." (R. Vol. I, p. 173.) 
Furthermore, the Department has gained agency experience in the AP A as it has been 
interpreting and applying it since its passage. 
-26-
The forth rationale looks to the rationale of repose. A&B has presented no evidence that 
the agency has ever interpreted § 67-5246(4) in a different manner. On the contrary, as pointed 
out by the district court, the Department has historically interpreted the statute this way. At the 
oral argument on the motion to dismiss, Judge Wildman stated that he had gone back and 
reviewed previous administrative appeals and found that the Department had issued decisions on 
reconsideration after the twenty-one day time period. (Tr. p. 14, Ins 4-13.) 
Furthermore, as discussed above, the Department's interpretation is consistent with its 
own rules, the long standing interpretation in Gilmore and Goble's law review article and the 
comments to the Idaho Rules of Administrative Procedure prepared by the Attorney General's 
Office in 1993. As stated in the comments to the Idaho Rules of Administrative Procedure: 
In Rules 720, 730, and 740 [of the Idaho Rules of Administrative 
Procedure, IDAPA 04.11.01.720, -.730 and .740], the presiding officer has twenty-
one days to act on petition for reconsideration. This means the officer must grant 
or deny reconsideration. But granting reconsideration is not the same as issuing the 
final decision following reconsideration. Reconsideration can be granted by 
issuing an order that says, "The petition for reconsideration is granted," then 
proceeding to schedule further hearings, briefing, etc., on reconsideration. 
Idaho Administrative Procedure Act with Comments and Idaho Attorney General's Model Rules 
of Practice and Procedure (1993), p. 93. The rationale of repose is met here as this 
interpretation has been in place since the very implementation of the APA. 
The fifth rationale looks to whether the agency interpretation is consistent with any 
contemporaneous interpretations. Here, we have a contemporaneous interpretation of the statue 
offered by Gilmore and Goble, the acknowledged drafters of the APA, which is consistent with 
the interpretation offered by the Department through IDAPA 37.01.01.740, which became 
effective July of 1993, soon after the passage of the APA. Also, as noted above, the 
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Department's interpretation of the reconsideration provision is consistent with the Attorney 
General's 1993 interpretation. 
It is not required that all the rationales be present for an agency interpretation to be 
entitled to deference. "If one or more of the rationales underlying the rule are present, and no 
'cogent reason' exists for denying the agency some deference, the court should afford 
'considerable weight' to the agency's statutory interpretation." Simp/at, 120 Idaho at 862, 820 
P.2d at 1219. Here, all the rationales underlying the rule of deference are present and there is no 
"cogent reason" why this court should not afford deference to the Department's statutory 
interpretation. Therefore, this Court should defer to the agency's interpretation and affirm the 
district court's order. 
II. BECAUSE THE DISTRICT COURT CONCLUDED THAT THE DIRECTOR 
ACTED WITHIN HIS AUTHORITY IN ISSUING THE AMENDED FINAL 
ORDER, THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE APPEAL OF 
THE DIRECTOR'S APRIL 27, 2011 ORDER. 
The district court correctly dismissed A&B's petition for judicial review of the Director's 
April 27, 2011 order as premature. The Director "disposed of' the petition and effectively 
withdrew the April 27, 2011 order by grating the petition for reconsideration and stating that a 
later order would subsequently be issued by the Department. Because there was not a final order 
when A&B filed its first notice of appeal, there was nothing for A&B to appeal and the district 
court lacked jurisdiction over the matter. See Laughy, at 875, 243 P.3d at 1063 ("Not only must 
the person seeking judicial review be a party, but there must be a final order."). Because the 
appeal was not yet ripe, this Court should affirm the district court's dismissal. 13 
l3 In its Amended Order on Motion to Dismiss, the district court authorized A&B to 
amend its petition for judicial review to seek review of the Director's June 30, 2011 Amended 
Final Order pursuant to LA.R. 17(m). A&B filed an amended notice of appeal on August 25, 
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III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DENIED A&B'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
THE AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIS M. BROMLEY. 
A&B's Motion to Strike requested that the Affidavit of Chris M. Bromley be stricken on 
the grounds that it is immaterial to the proceeding. 14 (R. Vol. I, p. 119.) The Affidavit of Chris 
M. Bromley consists of two attachments: Exhibit A, a copy of the Director's June 30, 2011 
Order Regarding Petition for Reconsideration and Exhibit B, the Director's June 30, 2011 
Amended Final Order. The district court denied the Motion to Strike because the affidavit was 
relevant to A&B' s argument that the Director lacked authority to issue the orders. (R. Vol. I, p. 
174.) 
The district court's denial of the Motion to Strike should be affirmed. The decision to 
grant or deny a motion to strike is left to the sound discretion of the district court and is reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion standard. See e.g., Mallonee v. State, 139 Idaho 615, 623, 84 P.3d 
551,559 (2004) ("whether the district court erred when it granted the motion to strike is 
reviewed on appeal under an abuse of discretion standard"). Because the Motion to Strike rests 
on the faulty premise that the Director lacked authority to issue the two orders, the district court 
did not abuse its discretion and this Court should affirm the district court's denial of A&B's 
Motion to Strike. 
2011, appealing the Amended Final Order. Along with this brief, the Department is filing a 
Motion to Augment which seeks to augment the record with A&B' s amended notice of appeal. 
The district court has not yet taken any action on A&B' s amended notice of appeal. 
14 As the district court noted in its decision, A&B did not move to strike the Second 
Affidavit of Chris M. Bromley filed on August 2,2011 in this matter. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Director, when faced with A&B' s petition for reconsideration, identified substantive 
issues in his order that needed to be reconsidered. Consistent with the plain language of Idaho 
Codes § 67-5246(4), he issued a "written order disposing of' the petition within twenty-one days 
by issuing a written order granting the petition. The Director then subsequently issued an order 
on reconsideration (his Amended Final Order). The Amended Final Order represented a 
substantive revision, revising his analysis of key parts of the original order, and expressly 
superseding the original order. The Director's actions in this case are consistent with the plain 
language of the APA. Moreover, the actions are consistent with the contemporaneous 
interpretation of the APA provided by Gilmore and Goble, recognized authorities on the APA, 
the written comments to the Attorney General's Model Rules of Procedure, and the Department's 
rules of procedure. 
Significantly, the Department's actions are also in line with the sound policy reasons for 
this interpretation. The Department's approach allows for agencies to have time to undertake a 
thoughtful, considered approach to complex cases. It serves no purpose to force an agency head 
to issue partially considered decisions if legitimate issues are raised on reconsideration. Such 
actions only foster litigation and result in wasted time and money for the courts and parties, as 
the courts will be forced to remand matters which might have been addressed by the agency if it 
had sufficient time to consider and parties will have to spend resources on appeals that might 
have been resolved before the agency. It does not make sense to limit informed decision making. 
If this Court agrees that the term "disposing of' is ambiguous, the Court should affirm the 
district court's holding that the Department's interpretation is entitled to deference under the 
Simplot deference test. The four prongs of the Simplot test have been met in this case. The 
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Department has been "clothed with the power to construe this law" as the Legislature has 
expressly entrusted the Department to administer the APA and to promulgate rules related to the 
APA. The Department's interpretation is reasonable as it is consistent with the plain language of 
the statue and is in accord with the sound policy reasons of encouraging judicial economy and 
informed decision making. The rationales underlying deference are also present here and 
support the Department's interpretation. 
Whether under a plain reading of Idaho Code § 67-5246(4) or using the Simp/ot agency 
deferent test, for the reasons discussed above, the Department respectfully requests that this 
Court affirm the district court's dismissal of A&B's petition for judicial review. 
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